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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BRUCE 0. NEWTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.

vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH and THE
UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendant-Respondent.

ll465

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This matter arises out of a collision between a motor
vehicle being driven by the appellant and a truck
owned by the State of Utah, being driven by an employee of the State Highway Department.
1

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY
LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, presiding, entered judgment in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff no cause of action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of
the District Court for error of law, and the case remanded to the District Court for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 30th day of December, 1966, at approximately I :10 a.m., at the intersection of 9th South and
State Streets, Salt Lake City, Utah, a Ford Ranchero
vehicle being driven by appellant collided with a 1965
International truck owned by the State of Utah and
driven by one Chauncey Eugene Kennedy, an employee
of the State Road Commission. Appellant's vehicle
wa~ travelling west on 9th South. The street was icy
and slushy from an earlier snow fall. The appellee's
vehicle was travelling east on 9th South and stopped
at the semaphore at the intersection of 9th Sou'th and
State Street in the middle lane of traffic and not in
the left turn holding lane. The driver of appellee's
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vehicle signaled for a left turn to go north on State
Street. When the light changed to green he proceeded
into the intersection and swung wide so that he would
be in the outside lane of traffic when the turn was
completed. According to his tesimony there was a car
waiting to turn left to go south on State Street which
stopped to allow him to proceed. This driver, if he
existed at all, was never found by either party nor
any of the investigators. He further states that one
or possibly two cars went through the intersection going
west and he waited for them to clear the intersection.
He then commenced his left turn and heard the collision. He tes'tified that at no time did he see the appellant's vehicle before the collision (R-172), in fact, did
not see it until he got out of his truck and walked
to the right side of his vehicle (R-175). The appellant
had been travelling west on 9th South from 485 East
9th South, had stopped for the light at 2nd East and
9th South and then proceeded west approaching the
intersection of 9th South and State. He was travelling
approximately 15, 16, or 17 miles per hour and had
his car in second gear (R-188, 193). There was no
evidence to the contrary. He first noticed the appellee's
vehicle stopped at the intersection, he was approximately 225 feet from the intersection which was approximately the same time as the light changed from
red to green for the ea~t-west traffic on 9th South. As
he approached the intersection he slowed down a bit
and when he was approximately 20 feet from the intersection he next observed appellee' s truck directly in
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front of him. He immediatley looked to his right and
turned sharply while applying his brakes. The left
front of his vehicle struck the right front fender of
the truck. Appellant testified that there were no cars
in front of him going through the intersection and no
others going north or south. The appellant first testified that he estimated the distances from the intersection when the semaphore turned green at between
100 and 150 feet, right on the west edge of Don Carlos
Drive-in parking lot. However, upon returned to the
scene and measuring the distance to the parking lot
he changed his testimony to the distance of approximately 225 feet from the intersection. Appellant lost
one eye, suffered a broken ankle and other injuries, '
and brought suit under the governmental immunity
act of Utah. Upon the above facts the court found
appellant solely liable and absolved the driver of the
state truck of any negligence, and denied appellant's
motion for a new trial.

POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT, IN REVIE,iVING
THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE, MUST
VIEW THE EVIDENCE IN A LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE APPELLANT AND
ALL REASONABLE INTENDMENTS MUST
BE INDULGED IN FAVOR OF REVERSING
RATHER THAN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT.
4

It is well settled in the law that the Supreme Court
when reviewing on appeal a judgment of the District
Court will view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the winning party and that the Supreme Court will
affirm rather than deny if in doing so the conclusion
can be based upon any logical reason. Rasmussen, et al,
v. Davis, 1 U.2d 96, 262 P.2d 488 (1953); Smit/i v.
Gallegos, 16 U.2d 344, 400 P.2d 570 (1965). However, in cases such as the instant case wherein the trial
judge entered a verdict and judgment of non-suit or
no cause of action, the courts have uniformly held that
in reviewing a judgment of no cause of action the
evidence must be viewed and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Raymond v. Union Pac. Railroad Co., 113 U.
26, 191 P.2d 137 (1948); Knox v. Snow, 119 U. 522,
229 P.2d 874 (1951).
The courts of the State of California have held,
as the courts of Utah have, regarding the viewing of
the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff
in cases such as this. In Reynolds v. National Gas
Equipment., 7 Cal Rptr 879 (Cal, 1960) the court said:
"On appeal for non-suit all reasonable intendments must be indulged in favor of reversing,
and judgment can be supported only if, giving
plaintiff's evidence fully prima facie value and
indulaing in everv reasonable inference that can
be d~'lwn theref;om and with all conflicts resolved in his favor, the result is a determination
that there is no substantial evidence to support
a judgment for the plaintiff."
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See also: Turner v. Ralph N. Parson Co., 117 Cal App
2d 109, 254 p 2d 970 ( 1953).
J

The Utah Court in Malstrom v. Olsen, 400 P.2d
209, 16 U.2d 316 (1965), said:
"We reverse non-suit judgments if there is
a reasonable basis in the evidence and the inferences therefrom when considered n a light most
favorable to the losing party (plaintiff) for a
judgment in her favor."
See also: T¥ilkerson v. Stephens, 403 P.2d 31, 16 U.2d
424 (1965), and Wightman v. Fuel Supply, 302
P .2d 471, 5 U.2d 373 ( 1956).
The evidence shows that the appellant was not
negligent in any manner whatsoever. The only testimony as to the speed of appellant was his own
statement that he might have been going 16 or 17
miles per hour and slowed up prior to entering the
intersection. (R-188, 193) There was likewise no
evidence that the appellant was guilty of improper
lookout. The evidence shows that the appellant observed the appellee' s truck stopped at the intersection making a left turn, and proceeded into the intersection. Any conflicts in the evidence must be disregarded and the evidence must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the appellant. In Taylor v. Secony-Mobile
Oil Co., 51 Cal Rptr, 764 (Calif, 1966), the court
stated:
"In reviewing the record on appeal from judgment entered on order granting motion for non6

suit conflicts in evidence must be disregarded.
Plaintiff's evidence must be given all value to
which it is legally entitled, every legitimate inference which may be drawn from the evidence
must be indulged in favor of the plaintiff, and
to support the judgment the court must conclude there is evidence of substantiality to support a verdict in favor of plaintiff if such verdict
were given." (Emphasis ours)
We submit in view of the foregoing authorities that
this court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and must engage in all inferences
which may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the
plaintiff.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING
FIND THE DRIVER OF APPELLEE'S
HICLE NEGLIGENT AS A :MATTER
LA,V", AND SUCH ERROR RESULTED
PREJUDICE TO THE APPELLANT.

TO
VEOF
IN

(A) The driver of appellee's truck, Mr. Chauncey
Eugene Kennedy, testified that he started into the
intersection at 9th South and State, observed at least
one other car stopped, allowed several cars to pass in
front of him, and then proceeded with his left turn.
(R-124) The duty of a driver intending to make a
left hand turn within an intersectoin is found in 416-73 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which
reads as follows:
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"The driver of a vehicle within an intersection
intending to turn to the left shall yield the right
of way to any vehicle approaching from the oppocite direction which is within the intersection or
so close thereto as to constitute an immediate ,
hazard."
·
The case of Smith v. Gallegos, 16 U.2d 344, 400
P.2d 570 ( 1965), amply shows that the foregoing section of the Utah Code places upon the person making
the left turn a greater duty of care. The Court in Smith,
said at page 571:
"The addition of the language just quoted
clearly places a greater duty on the left turner
in that he must yield not only to the approaching vehicles close enough to constitute a hazard
prior to beginning his turn, but also to vehicles
which will constitute a hazard 'during the time
he is moving within the intersection' which includes the time it is necessary for him to complete his turn."
In the instant case Mr. Kennedy had the duty to
yield to all vehicles approaching close enough to constitute a hazard prior to beginning his turn. He likewise had the duty to yield to other vehicles which were
so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Mr.
Newton's vehicle was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard as evidenced by the fact of the collision,
thus Mr. Kennedy was guilty of statutory negligence
in that he violated Section 41-6-73, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
(B) Mr. Kennedy from his own testimony clearly

8

1

started his left turn from a position straddling the
center lane and the left turn lane going east on 9th
South. (R-170, 171)
There are two sections of the Utah Code which set
out the lanes and the positions in lanes which drivers
must assume before proceeding. Section 41-6-61 (a),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, states:
"A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane and shall not
be moved from such lane until the driver has
first ascertained that such movement can be made
with safety."
and Section 41-6-66 (b), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, reads as follows:
"At any intersection where traffic is permitted
to move in both directions on each roadway entering the intersection, an approach for a left turn
shall be made in that portion of the right haH
of the roadway nearest the center line thereof
and by passing to the right of such center line
where it enters the intersection and after entering the intersection the left turn shall be made
so as to leave the intersection to the right of
the centerline of the roadway being entered.
Whenever practicable the left turn shall be
made in that portion of the intersection to the
left of the center line of the intersection."
The evidence amply shows that Mr. Kennedy violated both of these provisions of the traffic rules an<l
regulations and therefore was once again guilty of statutory negligence.
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( C) A driver has a duty to see what there is to
be seen. Spackman v. Carson, 117 U. 390, 216 P.2d 640
(1950); and Edmwnds v. Germer, 12 U.2d 215, 364
P.2d 1015 (1961). From the record it is clear that Mr.
Kennedy did not see the appellant's vehicle. (R-172)
In fact he stated that he never saw the vehicle until
he got out of the truck. (R-174)
Mr. Kennedy saw one car stopped at the intersection and allowed one more to pass in front of him
before completing his turn. (R-169) It is apparent
from the fact of the collision that Mr. Kennedy could
have seen appellant's vehicle if he would have looked.
The vehicle was there and so close as to constitute an
immediate hazard. Further the appellant was not
speeding but in fact was doing less than the posted
limit. (R-188) There was testimony to the effect that
Mr. Kennedy had worked many hours that day with
little or no sleep. This writer can only surmise as one
who has done this very thing that after many hours
a person's vision is not as clear, hi~ reflexes not as sharp,
and his thinking less than what it should be when
opera ting a vehicle.
A Fortiori that the record is resplendent with
evidence to show that Mr. Kennedy failed to keep a
proper lookout which is yet another basis for finding
negligence on his part.
Appellant submits from the foregoing that there
are at least three theories upon which the trial court
could have and should have found negligence on the
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part of Mr. Kennedy. All these factors when taken
together can lead to but one conclusion, and that is that
Mr. Kennedy was negligent and that this negligence
was the sole and proximate cause of the accident.
POINT III
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE UPON WHICH
THE COURT COULD BASE ITS FINDINGS
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS NEGLIGENT
OR THAT ANY ACTION ON THE PART OF
THE PLAINTIFF WAS THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
signed by the trial judge and entered in the record state
in effect that the appellant failed to maintain proper
lookout and travelled at an excessive rate of speed. A
reading of the transcript shows that without any doubt
no one except the appellant was able to testify as to
the approximate speed of the appellant. The driver of
the State vehicle did not even see the appellant. Appellant testified that he had been going 15, 16 or 17 miles
per hour prior to the intersection and even slowed upon
approaching the intersection. (R-188 and 193) There
is no other evidence in the record and none other was
even offered which would show the speed of the appellant's vehicle. Appellant submits that on this evidence
the court could not find excessive speed on the part
of the appellant. The burden was upon the defendant
to show the appellant's speed. A finding of fact as
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entered in this case could not be based upon mere speculation or conjecture but only upon a preponderance
of the evidence. In the case of Rich v. Eldridge, 106
N.J.L. 181, 147 A. 384, the court held in effect that a
car travelling 12 to 15 miles per hour would only justify
a finding of 12 miles per hour. Applying this prin<.'.iple
to the case at hand from the evidence that appellaut
was travelling 15, 16 or 17 miles an hour, it follows
that it is just as likely that he was going 15 miles per
hour which is substantially under the posted speed
limit and a speed which we would submit is reasonable
and proper in light of the circumstances on the night
in question. For the trial judge to make such a finding
of speed upon mere speculation or conjecture is not
proper.
The Utah Supreme Court stated in the case of
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 U.2d 16, 268 P.2d 968, at page
988:
"A choice of probabilities does not meet this
requirement. It creates only a basis for conjecture on which a verdict of the jury cannot stand."
Further there is nothing in the record which would
show that the 15 miles per hour speed of the appellant's
vehicle was the proximate cause of the accident.
submit that this is exactly what the trial judge found
when he stated his findings orally in open court.

'"re

"THE COURT: Mr. Newton has been ablr
represented. The Court appreciates the help of
counsel for the State in this matter. It is the find12

ing of the Court that the evidence clearly establishes negligence on the part of the plaintiff
in failing to keep appropriate lookout under
these circumstainces and as a result it is the
duty of the Court to find and return a judgment
of no cause of action for the plaintiff."
Record 247
The only evidence of the record on the point of improper lookout is the statement of the appellant that
he had observed the truck stopped at the intersection
preparing to make a left turn and then he had proceeded into the intersection. He at first had testified that
he had observed this vehicle approximately 150 feet
from the intersection, but later had changed his testimony to approximately 225 feet from the intersection
which would be approximately the same time the semaphore changed from red to green for the east-west
traffic on 9th South. He did not keep a direct eye on
the appellee's vehicle, but rather watched the other
traffic in the area. He did not directly see 'the appellee's
vehicle until he was approximately 20 feet from him,
and directly in his line of travel. The appellant was
aware of the presence of the appellee's vehicle but the
appellant likewise had to give some attention to the
management of his own vehicle and to other traffic
on the highway. He could not become absorbed in the
detail of what the appellee' s vehicle was doing. The
standard of care to be exacted from a plaintiff in regards to observance is set forth in a case of Peterson
'V. Neilson, 9 U.2d 302, 343 P.2d 731, wherein the court
at page 733 said:
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"It is not to be regarded as within the standard of due care to require her (plaintiff), from
the distance she was away, to observe where the
defendant was looking as he sat inside the cab
of his truck; nor was she bound to suspect that
he had not looked to the north and had seen
her approach; nor to anticipate that he would
proceed upon the highway without again looking
north."
The plaintiff in this case was not required to ascer- ,
tain from his own senses what the driver of the appellee's
vehicle was thinking about doing; he was not required
to anticipate that the driver of defendant's vehicle
would without any prior warning make a left turn in
front of the appellant's vehicle. The appellant was at >
least within 225 feet from the intersection when the light
changed, travelling through an intersection with a
semaphore that was green, thus appellant could assume
that he had the right of way and that the driver of the
appellee's vehicle would remain stopped and afford
him the right of way. There is nothing in the record ;
which would indicate that the driver of the appellee's
vehicle did anything that would warn the appellant of
his intention to commence his left turn in front of the
appellant's vehicle.
'Ve must remember that as the appellant approached
this intersection in addition to the street upon which he
was travelling there were three other streets intersecting
at this point. He must give attention to each of these
streets as well as to the intersection. All of his attention
could not very well or very safely have been focused on
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any one at any given instance. In the case of Martin v.
Stephens, 121 U. 484, 243 P.2d 747, the Utah Supreme
Court, in quoting from the concurring opinion in the
case of Bullock v. Luke, 98 U. 501, 98 P.2d 350, stated
the following which we submit is the controlling law
in this case.
" ... We must be careful not to stretch contributory negligence to the point where we make
it encumbant upon one not only to drive carefully
himself, but to drive so carefully as always to
be prepared for some sudden burst of negligence
of another and be able to avoid it."
The Court further stated:

"If a driver has to drive his car under the
assumption that everyone else is apt to be negligent, the next step would be for him to conclude
that he better get off the streets entirely or
someone is likely to hit him, and abandon the
streets to those who were just willing to take
the chances. If, under the circumstances such
as present in this case, where the plaintiff's right
of way is so clear no reasonable person would
have any doubt about it, he could not assume
that he would be afforded his right of way, the
only way drivers could safely proceed at an intersection woudl be to resort to: 'You first my
dear Gaston - no, after you, my dear Alphonse',
procedure or get out and hold a conference before either could safely proceed." Id. at p. 750.
The appellant had the right of way in this case and
he did not have the duty to anticipate that the driver
of the appellee's vehicle would negligently make the
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left turn, and as the court in the Martin v. Stephens
(supra) case suggesed, we must avoid measuring the
plaintiff's duty and charging him with negligence
because he may have failed to anticipate and avert
negligence on the part of the appellee.
We submit that the situation in the instant case
is similar to the situation facing the court in the case
of Williams v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Inst., 6
U.2d 283, 312 P.2d 567 (1957) in which the court, in
concluding its opinion, stated:
"If one dare not go through a green light or
along a through street if a car is stopped at the
intersecting streets until he is sure the said car
is not going to move, his right to proceed will
have been forfeited while he waits.

1

'

Common sense and fair play have their proper
place, and the standard of care under existing
circumstances must still be the rule."
The appellant was the favored driver and as such
could proceed into the intersection without anticipating
any danger. As the court stated in Morris v. Christensen, 11 U.2d 140, 356 P.2d 34 (1960):
"It is the duty of a driver to observe and
to see what there is to see so as to be able
to exercise ordinary precaution to prevent collisions such as this. This duty extends to the
favored driver with the right of way as well as
to the disfavored driver. But he who has the right
of way need not anticipate sudden outbursts
of negligence on the part of another driver. In-

16

I

_....I

deed it may be said that the failure to observe
is negligence proximately contributing to the
harm only where by observing the driver could
have avoided or lessened the resulting harm."
It is apparent from the foregoing authorities and
discussion that there is no basis in the record upon
which the court could have found the plaintiff guilty
of travelling at an excessive speed or of failing to maintain a proper lookout, and that from the foregoing it
is equally apparent that the court erred in making
these findings.

POINT IV
THE WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS ENTERED
BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE EVIDENCE NOR
WITH THE ORAL DECISION ANNOUNCED
BY THE TRIAL COURT, AND AN OBVIOUS
ERROR EXISTS IN THE RECORD IN THIS
CASE.
As mentioned earlier, the oral pronouncement of
the trial judge concluded that the appellee should be
granted judgment no cause of action because of improper lookout on the part of the appellant. The written
findings of fact and conclusions of law as entered by
the trial court state not only had the appellant been
guilty of improper lookout, but likewise guilty of trav-
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elling at an excessive speed. Further there was no
finding either oral or written that the alleged acts of
speeding or improper lookout on the part of the appellant was the sole and proximate cause of the accident.
The trial court's findings and conclusions should be
read in conjunction with the oral decision where it
appeared from the oral decision that the finding of
liability was based upon findings not expressed in the
written findings of fact. See: Vacca v. Steer, 441 P.2d
523 (Wash. 1968). This is likewise the rule in the
State of California as found in Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 32 Cal Rptr 830, 384
P.2d 158 (1963).

1

submit that although the oral pronouncements
of the trial court in announcing the judgment may
not constitute findings of fact in and of themselves,
they should be considered by the appellate court in reviewing the entire record and when properly incorporated in the record they should be examined to deter- ;
mine the correctness of the conclusions upon which the
judgment is based. See: Moree 'V. Moree, 371 P.2d
719 (Oklahoma). In Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling
Co., 4 U.2d 344, 294 P.2d 689 (1956) the Utah court 1
held that the opinion or memorandum of decision could ·
be consulted in construing findings of fact.
~Te

The general rule in regard to erroneous findings
is set forth in C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sect 1786, Vol
5B, at page 47:
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"An erroneous finding on a material fact is
ordinarily ground for reversal and thus the finding of a material fact contrary to the admission
of the parties or the undisputed evidence .is prejudicial error and ground for reversal. This has
been held to be so even though the trial court
would not have been required to make findings
of fact."
And in C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sect. 1789, Vol
5B, at page 59, it is stated:
"Where it is apparent that there is an erroneous conclusion of law influencing the judgment, a reversal may be required, but error in
a conclusion of law is no grounds for reversal
where no prejudice results to the party complaining."
Thus it appears that the general law is to the effect
that unless this erroneous finding of fact and conclusion of law is prejudicial, it is generally harmless
error. In looking for prejudicial error in this case it
is apparent that the appellant has been adversely affected. If the court had not made the erroneous finding
of fact and conclusion of law and had based his decision
solely upon his oral pronouncement, the point~ upon
which the appellant would now be appealing would
be somewhat fewer, and we would be entitled to seek
a remand of the case for a new trial upon the basis of
the erroneous conclusion of the court as to the improper
lookout. As it is, we are now confronted wfth the
burden of overcoming not only the erroneous finding
of improper lookout, but a finding of excessive speed
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on the part of the appellant, and lack of negligence
on the part of the driver of the appellee' s vehicle.
On at least one occasion, the court has rever.sed a
trial court for inconsistencies between findings and
conclusions. We refer to the case of Peterson v. Nielsen,
(supra) where the court said at p.:
"In view of the inconsistency between the findings made and the conclusions reached by the '
trial court the case is remanded for a new trial
on the issue as to plaintiff's right to recover."
There is no evidence from which it can be said that
had the appellant continued to observe the truck, he
could have avoided the accident. In fact, the contrary
appears; that is that the driver of the truck, Mr. Kennedy, claims to have allowed one or more cars to pass '
through the intersection, thus it would seem only he
could have avoided the accident.

SUMMARY
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
erred in finding appellant negligent under the facts
of this case, and of rendering a decision of no cause
of action. The court further erred in refusing to grant
appellant a new trial.
It is respectfully submitted that the appellant is
entitled to a reversal of the trial court's decision and
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the remanding of this matter back to the District Court
for a new trial on its merits.
Respectfully submitted,
Paul N. Cotro-Manes of
COTRO-MANES, FANKHAUSER & BEASLEY
430 Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Appellant
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